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1. Introduction 
 
The topic in this thesis is transnational norm diffusion and norm localization. The 
transnational norm(s) in focus is gender equality and the goals established in the UN Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing. I examine norm diffusion and localization through 
a case study comparing two Latin American countries; the Republic of Chile and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The purpose is to try to determine how and why certain 
norms have a better fit in a specific context. I will address three types of norms established in 
the Beijing Conference; women’s economic empowerment, women’s political empowerment 
and women’s reproductive rights.  
With the intention of trying to understand and explain which domestic characteristics are 
important in terms of norm diffusion and norm localization the research question is the 
following: ‘To what extent does the domestic context determine the likelihood of a 
transnational norm becoming localized?’ 
The basic argument is that the domestic context is the most determinant factor in terms of 
norm diffusion and norm localization. Furthermore, I highlight the importance of three 
specific features in the domestic context; regime type, ideology and organized religion. The 
reasoning goes as follows; the higher level of democratization the more likeliness of norm 
localization. Moreover, based on the core value of socialism, the argument is that norms of 
gender equality are more likely of becoming localized in a socialist state. Likewise, I make 
the assumption that the strength of organized religious groups will be a determinant factor in 
terms of the localization of norms concerning women’s reproductive rights, and specifically 
abortion rights. 
The methods used in this thesis are case studies and in-depth process tracing. Chile and 
Venezuela provide two interesting case studies; the former experienced a long dictatorship 
from the 70’s until late 80’s when transforming into a democratic state based on neoliberal 
political and economic ideas. Whilst Venezuela went through a severe economic crisis in the 
80’s and 90’s to transform into a socialist state in late 1998.  Furthermore, both countries are 
catholic and are more or less influenced by the moral doctrine of the Catholic Church. 
The main finding in this study confirms the primary argument; the domestic context in a 
country does determine the likeliness of norm localization. Furthermore, the socialist 
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ideology seems to be more correlated with the localization of norms of gender equality than 
does the neoliberal ideology. Religion also shows out, in line with the third hypothesis, to be 
a determinant of norm acceptance/ norm rejection regarding women’s reproductive rights. On 
the other hand, in the case of Chile and Venezuela, the distinctiveness of regime type in these 
two countries does not seem to be at play in terms of localization of these types of norms.   
The thesis starts off with a review of the Constructivist literature on norm diffusion and norm 
localization with the purpose of giving an overall picture of the Constructivist approach to the 
topic. It moves on to set out the theoretical frameworks and the hypotheses and thereafter this 
thesis proceeds to account for the research design and methodology. After that the paper 
continues to the analysis section and reports on the Beijing Conference and then moves on to 
the case studies. Finally, the paper concludes on the main findings of the research, 
implications for future research and main limitations. 
 
2.  Review of the Constructivist Literature on Norm Diffusion and Norm 
Localization 
 
To date, there is a wide range of literature about norm diffusion and norm localization. Since 
many authors do agree that norms do matter, namely that they do influence and shape the 
interests, decisions and perceptions about reality of states and individuals, the question is 
now; which norms matter? When, how and why do norms matter? And what does the process 
of a transnational norm becoming localized look like? 
 In the literature there is a wide interest in what role norms play in transforming national and 
international politics. Some authors talk about a norm’s life cycle and how it emerges, 
spreads and finally becomes internalized in a political system (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998:888).  Some authors define a norm as a standard of appropriate behaviour in 
international society, a rule that defines what is appropriate or not, the kind of behaviour that 
is acceptable and fundamental for belonging to the international ‘club’ of ‘decent’ states 
(ibid). The definition of what appropriate means is different in different communities, and 
certain actions are considered as norm breaking behaviour because they are contrary to a way 
of behaving in a specific context. Hence, a norm becomes an international norm when its 
compliance or not is noticed in the international society (ibid: 892).  Consequently, according 
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to many authors, a norm becomes an international norm when a critical mass (ibid: 893) of 
states adhered to it.  
International norms are often widely intertwined with the domestic normative structure. 
Furthermore, many authors highlight the importance of the domestic political structure and 
how it receives and affects the localization of a transnational norm (Checkel 1999:84, 
Acharya 2004:246, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:908, Alvarez 1999:193). On the other hand, 
most transnational norms of appropriate behaviour emerged in the domestic arena of one or 
several avant-garde states, and thereafter, spread until they reached the critical mass of 
adherent states and thus became considered international norms. A good example of this is 
the campaign for women’s suffrage. The actors who advocate in favour of a transnational or a 
national norm are defined as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ by Finnemore and Sikkink. These actors 
can either call for an international norm to become localized in the domestic arena or they can 
advocate for a domestic norm in international society. These actors are essential in the 
emergent stage of a norm, thus norm emergence is a process of persuading states to adopt the 
new norm. Although, very little work has been done on this stage of the norms lifecycle, an 
important question is how does a norm actually emerge? Important factors mentioned in the 
literature seem to be human agency, chance occurrences, favourable events etc although some 
authors emphasize on the norm entrepreneurs and their organizational base (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998:896). 
The issue of norm emergence has received much critique within the norm diffusion literature, 
and it is said that there is an exaggerated focus on structure which thus neglects the impact of 
agency, and consequently, according to the critique, when agency is neglected it is very hard 
to explain how norms emerge (Checkel 1999:84). Constructivist authors emphasize the 
mutual construction between norms and actors, that norms shape interests and perceptions 
just as well as agents shape norms, and they are thus mutually influencing and constructing 
each other. As mentioned, auto-critique has been made on the exaggerated emphasis on 
structure at the expense of agency. 
In contrast to the constructivist vision of norms other literature from the neorealist and 
neoliberal traditions have a different conception of norms; the former reject the causality of 
norms, while the latter although recognizing the capability of norms to regulate states’ 
behaviour, they do not consider norms to construct the interests of states (Checkel 1999:84). 
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Moreover, critique is made for failure to clearly explain the causality of how norms are 
spread and accepted in states, and for studies of norm diffusion being too centred on 
correlations when it comes to establishing if and how norms influence the interests and 
behaviour of states (Checkel 1999:84). Related to this critique is the emphasis in some of the 
literature on investigating the ‘domestic salience’ (ibid) of an international norm, namely its 
legitimacy in the domestic arena and the domestic structure; and to investigate which actors 
have legitimacy of advocating for a norm and which actors do not.  
Many authors also highlight the importance of disaggregating the state and not to see it as a 
unitary actor, but instead as a unit within which there is a wide variety of actors who are 
capable of influencing policy makers through their advocacy for new norms (Cortell and 
Davis 1996:454, Checkel 1999, Acharya 2004, Friedman 1999). 
Further critique is made to the cosmopolitan claim of universal values; specifically that 
cosmopolitan scholars put too much emphasis on transnational norms and often categorize 
them as good norms in contrast to the local norms that are seen as backward and not 
progressive. The highlighting of only transnational norms and norm entrepreneurs is 
neglecting the role of local agency and structure in terms of norm acceptance or not (Acharya 
2004:242). 
According to many authors the wider acknowledgement of these factors would partially 
answer the question and establish the process and mechanism through which norms are 
spread and become localized. The argument is that foreign norms are always conditioned by 
domestic norms, and the localization of a transnational norm depends on its ‘fit’ into the 
domestic normative, political and cultural structure. In short, the domestic values and 
structure, together with the capacity of the norm entrepreneurs, condition the norm 
localization or the norm rejection (Acharya 2004:246). 
The importance of the domestic political structure is furthermore illustrated in literature about 
Latin American feminist advocacy networks. Since neoliberal states advocate for a 
minimalistic level of state intervention and for the expansion of the private sector, they tend 
to subcontract feminist NGOs as gender experts in their domestic politics. This dynamic has 
contributed to a professionalization of feminist NGOs, in the sense that they become 
technocrats working for the state, instead of being a movement of norm entrepreneurs 
fighting for women’s right (Alvarez 1999:182). 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
To be able to answer the research question I will use two theoretical frameworks that are 
based on the assumptions of Constructivist International Relations Theory. Constructivists 
believe that norms/structure and agents are mutually constructed, hence, norms provide 
agents with their interests and agents construct norms, and accordingly it is an ongoing 
process of construction. Moreover, constructivists do not distance themselves from rational 
choice in the norm diffusion literature; instead they consider rational choice and social 
construction to be interrelated (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:888).  
Specifically I will use the theoretical framework of Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink 
on norm diffusion and the theoretical framework of Amitav Acharya on norm localization. 
Furthermore, Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon provide assumptions about gender norms 
specifically; in their framework they address gender issues and when and under which 
circumstances governments promote women’s rights and sexual equality. 
Using the theory on norm diffusion will help me to account for the international process, in 
this case the Beijing Conference and its follow ups, and the logic and type of norms 
established in the Platform for Action. Furthermore, by using the theory of localization, I will 
be able to analyse how the different UN norms fit into the domestic structures in Chile and 
Venezuela. And with help of the framework of Htun and Weldon I will be able to analyse the 
different types of gender equality norms and how they interrelate and fit with different 
features in the domestic structure. In short, combining the two theories with the framework 
will help get a comprehensive picture on how and why the domestic structure is a 
determinant of the localization of transnational norms.  
The first two authors talk about the lifecycle of a norm; norm emergence,  norm cascade and 
norm internalization. The emergence of the norm is highly dependent on the norm 
entrepreneurs and their organizational platform (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:896), in this 
case the organizational platform would be the Beijing Summit organized by the UN, and 
hence, the UN is a strong platform with resources and influence, and the membership of 
states is voluntary. In the stage of norm emergence the capability of the norm entrepreneurs, 
transnational as well as domestic, is an important factor for the norm to enter the second stage 
of its lifecycle; the norm cascade. In this second stage a process of international socialization 
is taking place; more and more states adopt the norm for different reasons; to achieve 
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international legitimacy, and/or enhance domestic legitimacy, international and domestic 
pressure etc. The last stage of the norm is norm internalization; this means that the norm is 
not questioned or up for discussion anymore, but has become a part of the expected 
appropriate behaviour in a certain community, hence, it is a habit and something that is taken 
for granted (ibid:895). Furthermore, indicators of norm internalization are its integration in 
national law, professionally and in the domestic bureaucracy.  
This theory also emphasizes the importance of the domestic structure; norms never enter into 
a vacuum but are always conditioned by prior logic of appropriate behaviour and beliefs. And 
it is here where the capability of the local norm entrepreneurs is fundamental for the norm 
internalization. The kind of norm is a determinate factor in terms of achieving a norm cascade 
and internalization, according to these authors, norms that prohibit bodily harm to vulnerable 
groups or advocate for legal equality of opportunity are more likely to be embraced than 
other types of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:907). Consequently, drawing on this 
theory, a norm of gender equality should belong to the category of more easily embraced 
norms since it can be labelled as a norm of equality of opportunity. 
To analyse the variation in norm acceptance I will use Amitav Acharya’s theory of norm 
localization. The concept of localization implies that the variation of norm acceptance 
depends on the local structure, culture, beliefs and how the new norm fits into to the prior 
domestic structure (Acharya 2004:239). The better the ‘cultural match’ of the new norm the 
more likely the norm is to become localized; hence, cultural match implies the extent to 
which the norm is ‘matching’ with the local set of values such as discourse, legal system and 
bureaucratic agencies (ibid:243). 
There are three basic ideas of norm localization; first and foremost, the local initiative adopts 
an international norm for instrumental reasons, for example to enhance local legitimacy. 
Secondly, the receiving country adapts the new norm to its local conditions, thus only the 
characteristics of the norm that fit into the local context are adopted. And third, the effect of 
the localization may be increased legitimacy and prestige but without the need to forsake 
prior beliefs and practices (Acharya 2004:245). 
The independent variables of norm localization are the following: The strength of the local 
norms, the way a new norm impacts local legitimacy, authority of the norm takers, the 
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credibility of the transnational and local agents, local culture and traditions and the abilities 
of the local norm entrepreneurs to present the norm as similar to a local norm. 
Finally, to be able to analyse the variation in norm acceptance depending on which type of 
gender equality issue, I will use Htun and Weldon’s framework. The basic assumption in 
their framework is that the general norm of gender equality consists of a variety of issues, 
which all have different degrees of fit into domestic structures (Htun and Weldon 2007:3). 
They point out level of democratization (regime type), the ideology of the political party in 
government and religion as important variables in terms of norm acceptance and norm 
promotion by governments. The assumptions are that, typically, left wing governments are 
more favourable to issues of gender equality, especially class-based policies addressing the 
economic inequalities between women and men. On the other hand, in terms of gender status 
norms which address all women as a group, for example reproductive rights, constitutional 
equality, quotas etc. the ideology of the government is not assumed to be a determinant 
factor.  While certain gender status norms, like abortion and contraception methods, are 
expected to meet strong opposition from organized religion (ibid: 19). In short, the nature of 
the issue is determinant for norm localization and norm promotion. Level of democratization 
may have different effects; in one sense emerging democracies or autocracies will be more 
vulnerable to international pressure to adhere to an international norm than consolidated 
democracies, this is due to their likely need and/or willingness to achieve international 
legitimacy. At the same time many consolidated democracies typically have an organized 
civil society with the capacity of putting pressure on the government for higher degrees of 
sexual equality (Htun and Weldon 2007:11). Moreover, the assumption is that 
democratization does not necessarily lead to more progressive norms in terms of gender 
equality; in many states in Latin America the organized religion became more powerful after 
the democratic transitions, and therefore an obstacle to progressive norms and policies (Htun 
and Weldon 2007:4).  
3.1 Hypotheses 
The implications of the theories of norm diffusion and norm localization are the base of the 
first hypothesis. The argumentation goes as follows; the norm cascade is a consequence of 
states need for international and domestic legitimacy in order to enhance their credibility and 
image.  Democratic states more often make a big effort to belong to the international club of 
legitimate regimes with a good image and high levels of credibility. Likewise, free and 
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democratic states more often have a vibrant civil society with the capability of influencing the 
decision making process and to hold its representatives accountable. Therefore, there is more 
potential for transnational norm localization in these types of states. Furthermore, the 
localization theory would suggest the same hypothesis since it builds on the degree to which 
the international norm fits into the local context. Most of the international norms emerge in 
western democratic states before they are considered an international norm and international 
appropriate behaviour. Thus, democratic/ free states more often have a similar domestic 
structure, which would increase the chances of a norm becoming localized.  
Thus, the first hypothesis (H1) is: Less free regimes will be more resistant to norm 
localization than democratic regimes/ free regimes. 
The second hypothesis is based on the nature of the socialist ideology and its emphasis on 
equality. Typically, socialist regimes would be more receptive to norms related to all types of 
equality; sexual as well as economic. While liberals believe in and advocate for formal 
equality of opportunity, socialists advocate for the necessity of changing the structure to 
achieve equality of outcome, hence achieving strict equality (Phillips 1997:30). 
Consequently, regimes with both types of ideologies would be likely to adopt transnational 
norms of gender equality, but as equality is the central part of socialism, the norm of gender 
equality may achieve the same or higher level of localization in a socialist regime than in a 
neoliberal regime. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis (H2) is the following: Neo-liberal regimes will be more 
resistant to norm localization than socialist regimes. 
The third hypothesis is based on the regressive nature of the moral doctrine of the Catholic 
Church. Typically, as accounted for in the framework of Htun and Weldon, organized 
religion will be an opposing force to certain types of gender equality norms. Hence, 
organized religious groups will not only work to remain status quo, but are also reactionary 
norm entrepreneurs, thus having an active role advocating for the adoption of conservative 
norms.  
Hence, the third hypothesis is as follows: The strength of organized religious groups will be a 
determinant factor in the localization of women’s rights norms. 
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4. Research Design – Concepts, Variables, Indicators and Data Collection 
4.1 Dependent Variable: Norm Localization 
 
The dependent variable of the research question is norm localization; and in this context the 
norm is gender equality. Norm localization in this case means that a transnational norm gets 
adopted, adjusted to the local context and implemented in practice in the domestic arena. The 
variation of norm localization depends on the extent to which the transnational norm fits in to 
the local political structure. 
 The meaning of the concept of gender equality can vary depending on which ideological 
standpoint you take, but the general meaning is that women and men should have the same 
rights and possibilities in life. Formal rights should be practically implemented in the public 
and private sphere; hence, gender equality requires strict equality between women and men, 
in the sense that being born female or male should not impose restrictions of opportunities or 
outcomes in life (Phillips 1997:30). 
 
4.2 Independent Variable(s) 1: Regime Type 
 
IV 1a: Political Rights 
IV 1b: Civil Liberties 
The IV 1 is regime type as classified by the Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org/). 
Freedom House measures the level of freedom in different countries; they are given the status 
of free, partly free or not free regimes. The focus is on political rights and civil liberties; the 
emphasis is on the practical fulfilment of these rights although formal rights (constitutional/ 
legal guarantees) are also taken into account (Freedom House 2012). The Freedom House 
indicators for political rights are; free participation in the political process, right to vote, 
variety of political parties/alternatives, freedom of joining political parties and organizations, 
possibility to compete for office and accountability of political representatives. Indicators for 
civil rights are; rule of law, autonomy from the state, free expression and beliefs and free 
association and organization (Freedom House 2012, Methodology). All these indicators are 
important factors facilitating norm diffusion and norm localization; presumably the higher 
level of political freedom and civil rights the better the possibilities for political norm 
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entrepreneurs to pressure for norm localization. Furthermore, a strong civil society makes it 
possible for non-political norm entrepreneurs to be successful in their aims and to hold 
political representatives accountable for not adopting transnational ethical and ‘good’ norms. 
IV 2: Ideology 
The second independent variable is ideology. As previously mentioned, different ideologies 
may have different levels of acceptance of different transnational norms. In the socialist 
ideology equality is the central building block, on the other hand, liberals also advocate for 
equality of opportunity although they legitimize inequalities based on choice. Therefore, the 
ideology ruling the political system in the two countries may be a determinant factor for the 
local fit of a transnational norm. 
IV 3: Organized Religion 
The third independent variable is religion. Since the domestic structure in a country works as 
a filter for international norms and their localization, and religion is a fundamental part of the 
structure in many societies, it becomes an important determinant factor. Hence, certain types 
of international norms may encounter resistance from organized religion and doctrinal 
morality, and therefore it is an important variable in terms of norm localization. 
 
4.3 Intervening variables: 
 
Capacity and authority of norm entrepreneurs 
The norm diffusion and localization literature emphasises the capacity and organizational 
platform of the transnational and national norm entrepreneurs. In this case the UN is the 
transnational norm entrepreneur. Furthermore, both Chile and Venezuela participated in the 
Beijing Summit 1995 and representatives from both states confirmed their dedication to 
achieving the established goals. Considering the capacity, legitimacy and organizational 
platform of the UN, the conclusion is that the original norm entrepreneur in this case is very 
strong. The capacity and organizational base of the local norm entrepreneurs is just as an 
important factor, their capacity is interdependent with the other features of the domestic 
structure, and how it interacts and is affected by the transnational process. 
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Type of norm 
Generally, the norm diffusion literature stresses that norms which prohibit bodily harm of 
vulnerable people and norms that enforce equality of opportunity for all peoples are more 
easily accepted in most contexts (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 907). In this case, focusing 
on women and the economy and women in power and decision making, which can be 
classified as norms of equal opportunity, and hence, have the characteristics of the type of 
norm that should be more easily accepted in most contexts. However, norms on women’s 
reproductive rights in forms of abortion and contraceptive measures often provoke religious 
opposition and thereby in some contexts do not have the same level of salience as norms of 
equal opportunity. 
 
5. Overview of Concepts, Variables and Indicators 
 
In order to assess norm localization in terms of gender equality, and more specifically; 
women’s empowerment in the economy and in politics, I will use two concepts and their 
indicators established in the Global Gender Gap Report by Harvard University and London 
Business School. Using data from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey 
this report measures the inequalities of women and men, hence, the global ‘gender gap’. One 
of the indicators of the gender gap is ‘Labour Force Participation’ which measures the 
percentage of active women in the labour market, either being employed, or unemployed, but 
looking for work. Another indicator in the report is ‘Wage Equality for Similar Work’: 
Meaning the extent to which women and men receive the same remuneration for the same 
type of work. 
And the third indicator of the global gender gap that I will look into is ‘Women in 
Parliament’ which measures the percentage of women and men in the parliament.  
The first edition of the Global Gender Gap Report is from 2006. Accounting for the years 
prior to that date I will use data from the United Nations Developments Programme. The 
International Human Development Indicators provide data of the Labour Force Participation 
Rate, female-male ratio (Ratio of female to male shares), in other words, the percentage of 
women who are active on the labour market in relation to the total share of active men.  
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Data of Political Empowerment prior to 2006 will be provided by the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif251299.htm). It instructs on absolute number of 
Women in National Parliaments as well as percentage of women in national parliaments. 
In terms of ‘women and health’ I will look into national legislations and additional 
information on the Global Gender Gap Report on this issue. 
 
6. Methodology: Case Studies and Process Tracing 
 
The methodology used will be case studies, these will include, as mentioned earlier, Chile 
and Venezuela. These two cases are handpicked on the basis of having pronounced 
differences in type of regime and their system’s design; Chile is considered a free regime 
(Freedom House 2006, Chile). Meanwhile, Venezuela is ranked as a partly free regime 
(Freedom House 2006, Venezuela). Hence, the two countries differ in terms of political rights 
and civil liberties (IV 1). Furthermore, Chile has a neoliberal economic and political system 
while Venezuela has a socialist economic and political system (IV 2: ideology). Both 
countries are officially Catholic and have more or less strong organized religious groups. 
I will focus on the time period from 1995, the year of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women in Beijing, to 2006. This is to be able to observe the changes in Venezuela between 
the earlier governments and from when Hugo Chavez came into power in late 1998. The 
timeframe also has the purpose of studying Chile up until Michelle Bachelet came into power 
in Chile in 2006. The reason for this is to control for external shocks, and thus be able to test 
the hypothesis about ideology. Michelle Bachelet was a more avant-garde and progressive 
president of Chile than her predecessor. She took various measures to reduce gender 
inequalities (Freedom House 2011, Chile), and furthermore, she took her coalition La 
Concertación into a more leftist direction. 
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7. The UN Fourth World Conference on Women and the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action 
 
This international Conference was organized by the United Nations in 1995 and is regarded 
as a milestone in terms of the global advancement on women’s rights. The goals established 
in the ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ are a part of the Millennium 
Development Goals (UNFPA). The Conference was the fourth international gathering 
focusing on women’s issues. The intention was to set up a common global action plan for 
reaching the objective; absolute equality between women and men. 189 Governments 
participated in the Conference, and declared their commitment to reach the established goals. 
Furthermore, every five years representatives from the UN and from each state meet to 
review and appraise the progress made in the implementation of the norms established in the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. 
7.1 Problem Formulation and Global Strategic Objectives 
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action established a wide range of global strategic 
objectives to achieve gender equality, with labels such as; ‘woman and poverty’, ‘education 
and training for women’, ‘woman and health’, ‘violence against women’, ‘woman and armed 
conflict’, ‘women and the economy’, ‘women in power and decision making’, ‘institutional 
mechanisms for the advancement of women’, ‘human rights and women’, ‘women and the 
media’, ‘women and the environment’ and ‘the girl and the child’(UN, 1995). 
The points of focus in this thesis are ‘women and the economy’, ‘woman in power and 
decision-making’ and ‘women and health’, and the strategic goals within these four topics.  
7.2 Women and the Economy 
During the conference many problems were highlighted, such as the unequal opportunities of 
women and men in the economic sector. The lack of public or private childcare and the 
sharing of family responsibilities and housework make it harder for women to integrate in the 
labour market. Globalization is in many ways helping some women integrate in the labour 
market, while for many others it has exacerbated the inequalities and the poor working 
conditions. For, on a global scale, advance on these issues, the Beijing Summit urged all 
participating member states to, on the governmental level; legislate on equal pay for equal 
positions/work between men and women, and to legislate on discrimination in terms of sex or 
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women’s reproductive role on the labour market. States are also urged to change their 
policies in terms of work pattern, to restructure these patterns to incentivize the sharing of 
family responsibilities by men and women in the households. Moreover, states are called on 
to set an example as an employer and implement policies of equal opportunities of men and 
women in the public administration (UN 1995, p. 65-78). 
7.3 Woman in Power and Decision-Making 
To incorporate women into the power and the decision-making process governments were 
urged to set targets for equal representation in all governmental and public administration, to 
increase the number of women effectively affirmative action is advised. Furthermore, 
electoral systems need to be revised for gender bias, and analyzed according to the possible 
impact they have on equal representation between men and women. The governments are 
urged to ensure that all government funded organizations adopt non-discriminatory policies. 
Moreover, political parties are urged to remove barriers that are directly or indirectly 
discriminatory towards women and to incorporate gender issues into their agenda (UN 1995, 
p. 79-84). 
7.4 Women and Health – Reproductive Rights 
In terms of women and health the Beijing Platform for Action emphasized the importance of 
equality between men and women on all levels to improve women’s health, including the 
equal sharing of family responsibilities. Furthermore the declaration recognized the threat 
that structural economic adjustments impose on global health and especially on women’s 
health. In the declaration it is stated that the subordinated role that women all over the world 
have been ascribed, and the lack of reproductive health facilities, has created a situation in 
which women are not in control over their reproductive role. In turn this has led to unwanted 
pregnancies that resulted in millions of illegal and unsafe abortions. To improve women’s 
reproductive health, and the implementation of reproductive rights and human rights, 
governments are urged to recognize the problem of unsafe abortions and the threat it poses to 
millions of women around the globe. To counter these problems governments should provide 
safe abortions in cases where abortion is legal, and where it is illegal, provide adequate 
healthcare services including other types of family planning methods and information (UN 
1995, p. 34-44). 
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8. Case Studies: The Republic of Chile and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela 
8.1 Political Context: Chile  
Since 1973 Chile was a dictatorship under the authoritarian rule of Augusto Pinochet, the 
political repression by the military regime was brutal during the 70’s, and thousands of 
citizens were killed and abducted by the heinous regime. In the beginning of the 80’s, despite 
the repression, more and more citizens started to mobilize against the dictatorship and the 
functioning of the economic system, this was due to Pinochet’s extreme neoliberal structural 
adjustments, and their profound negative consequences on people’s daily life. One of the 
most salient groups in this national mobilization was the women’s movement (Franceschet 
2004:507). The mobilization of women achieved a relative legitimacy due to the fact that 
they actively justified their activism on the bases of their motherhood identities and the 
importance of the family
1
 (Franceschet 2004:514). Since the socially conservative regime of 
Pinochet highly valued the traditional societal structure and the institution of the family, 
women’s mobilization and activism did not face hard repression from the regime. 
On the other hand, due to the authoritarian character of regime, the political parties in 
opposition were very weak during the 80’s, which made them dependent on social 
movements. These circumstances
2
 ascribed a lot of bargaining power to the women’s 
movement and female activists used a double militancy strategy. Thus, advocating for 
women’s rights from inside the left and centre political parties, who, due to their dependency 
relation to social movements, gave women space for radical demands in terms of gender 
equality. In this way, owing to the relatively favourable political opportunity structure for 
social movements in general, and women’s movements in particular, the left and the centre 
parties incorporated many of the women’s demands in their political agenda (Walsh 2012: 
1328).  
In 1989 a referendum voting in favour or against an eight year continuation of the Pinochet 
regime took place. The political opposition was successful in the referendum which led to the 
                                                          
1
 Thousands of women lost their daughters, sons, husbands, relatives and friends during the brutal regime of 
Pinochet. Based on that experience they protested against the regime making the claim it was anti-family due to 
violent political repression, violence and economic repression through extreme liberal structural adjustments, 
which broke up thousands of families. 
2
 The two main circumstances were that the political parties in the opposition needed support from social 
movements and that the women’s movement did not face political repression from the dictatorship. 
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end of the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. The oppositional coalition of left and centre 
parties formed the new government, La Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (CPD, 
the Coalition of Parties for Democracy). In the democratic transition-process, however, 
women saw their influence being seriously marginalized; thus, the relatively favourable 
political opportunity structure for the women’s movement during the 80’s was short-lived. 
Therefore, the arrival of democracy in Chile had both positive and negative effects on the 
women’s movement and their demands; on the one hand, as mentioned, the political parties 
rejected many of the women’s demands once they regained their strength. But on the other 
hand, some of the women activists achieved insider positions within the political parties, and 
the new democratic government was eager to achieve international legitimacy, and therefore 
it ratified both international and national agreements regarding gender equality (Ríos Tobar 
2003:257).  
Although the new government was positioned centre/left ideologically, the Chilean transition 
was conditioned by an agreement between all the pro-democratic parties, including the ultra 
conservative right wing parties. Hence, it was a ‘pacted’ transition in which the right wing 
and the Catholic Church had a lot of power (Franceschet 2007:7). This lead to a fear of la 
Concertación to destabilize the political climate by putting forward contentious issues, for 
example issues concerning women’s rights (Ríos Tobar 2003:260). Despite the conditioned 
transition, progress was being made; in 1991 President Patricio Aylwin
3
 established the 
National Women’s Service, SERNAM, (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), a state agency 
dedicated to women’s issues. However, from its creation the women’s agency was a polemic 
issue; the conservative right wing parties
4
 saw the creation of SERNAM as ‘giving in’ to 
feminist demands and large fractions of the Christian Democratic Party did not give its full 
support to the agency (Ríos Tobar 2003:262). 
The process of returning to democracy and a strong party system, in combination with 
international funding, had strong effects on the women’s movements. Women activists were 
being incorporated into the state agencies, professional NGOs and political parties. On the 
one hand, because the strong party system absorbed civil society activists into their 
organizations, and on the other hand, international funders preferred to work with highly 
professional NGOs, leaving grassroots organizations in a disadvantaged position.  In this way 
                                                          
3
 Belonging to the Christian Democratic Party. 
4
 The Independent Democratic Union (UDI), a far right party with strong ties to the Pinochet regime, and the 
National Renovation (RN); a conservative and economically neoliberal party. 
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women activists were highly valued as ‘gender experts’, but at the same time they lost their 
role as representatives for civil society and for more radical claims in terms of gender 
equality. This, in turn, weakened the women’s movement and civil society5 in general 
(Alvarez 1999:192). Hence, la Concertación did not incentivize or lay the ground for a 
vibrant civil society with the possibilities of making alternative claims, different than those of 
the professional NGOs and political parties. Moreover, the international funding dynamic 
contributed to a ‘professionalization’ (Alvarez 1999:194) of parts of the women’s movement, 
and this on the expense of grassroots activists possibilities to be heard. 
With this political climate prevailing in Chile; namely a weakened women’s rights movement 
and a government coalition persistently seeking compromise with the conservative political 
right and the Catholic Church, the Fourth World Conference on Women took place.  
 
8.1.1 Women and Economy  
Pinochet instated a neoliberal economic and political system in Chile, with minimized state 
intervention and made big cuts in social services. The social conservatism of the military 
regime enforced the stereotypical gender roles; the natural role of women was to be self-
sacrificing mothers and defenders of the family, a social norm that obstructed women’s 
integration on the labour market (Walsh 2012:1338). In the 80’s the neoliberal economic 
system lead to mass-unemployment followed by a deep economic crisis and decreasing living 
standards throughout the country (Franceschet 2004:514). Despite the occurrences in the 
80’s, the transition to democracy did not entail a change of the economic system induced by 
the authoritarian regime. Moreover, the Chilean political Constitution from 1980, written by 
the military, was not amended but continued to be the basic law after the transition. Hence, 
the transition was completely controlled and directed by the norms established by the 
previous dictatorship (Ríos Tobar 2003:258) and the political and economic neoliberal 
ideology continued to prevail. 
Augusto Pinochet approved two amendments in the Civil Code just before the national 
referendum; one which granted women full civil rights and one ending the marital power that 
                                                          
5 Due to the strong party system in Chile this was a general trend, hence, it did concern all kinds of civil society 
actors, not only the women’s movement (Olavarría 2003, p. 19). 
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men had legally exercised over their wives. Furthermore Pinochet ratified the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of Women (CEDAW) (Walsh 2012:1338). 
The new government, la Concertación, was eager to modernize and achieve international 
legitimacy, hence to adopt international norms and be a part of the international club of 
democratic and legitimate states. The becoming President Patricio Aylwin, from the Christian 
Democratic Party promised, just before the transition, to end discrimination against women 
on the labour market and to incentivize changes in the traditional family patterns. Namely, he 
endorsed the idea of the necessity of shared responsibility at home to facilitate women’s 
incorporation into the labour market (Walsh 2012:1339). Yet, the promises were of the 
moderate type, Aylwin rejected the ‘strict’ sharing of family responsibilities at home, and he 
emphasized that one of the purposes of ending the discrimination of women on the labour 
market was to protect the institution of the family (Walsh 2012:1338).  
From 1991 to 1994 SERNAM
6
 developed a plan for achieving equality of opportunity 
between women and men, and in 1995 the Equal Opportunity Plan (PIOM)
7
 was adopted by 
the Government (Grau, Olea and Peréz 2000:20). One of the main objectives of the plan was 
to facilitate women’s integration and access to the labour market and to improve their 
working conditions. The main reason for addressing the issue of women’s integration and 
conditions on the labour market was declared to be the necessity of improving the Chilean 
productivity and its integration in the international market. The Plan defines efficiency in the 
use of the national workforce as a requirement to consolidate the Chilean position in the 
international market. And applying the efficiency strategy would implicate potentiate women 
in the workforce and to improve their working conditions (SERNAM 1994:35). Some of the 
milestones in the plan were to adapt the occupational training for women to the needs of the 
market; facilitate the access to work for women; to make the work compatible with the 
maternity and paternity role; improve the quality of employment for women; to raise 
awareness amongst employers to assure the incorporation to employment and the 
development of equitable work careers between women and men (SERNAM 1994:37, 42). 
When the Beijing conference arrived in September 1995 the Chilean statement concerning 
‘Women and the Economy’ was in line with the goals established in the PIOM. The National 
Plan worked as the base of the Chilean position for the international meeting (Grau, Olea and 
                                                          
6
 The National Women’s Service 
7
 Plan de Igualdad para las Mujeres 1994 – 1999.  
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Peréz 2000:20). The central concerns of the Chilean government in its official statement were 
the integration of women in the labour force; better employment opportunity; better working 
conditions and to reduce the pay gap between men and women. Moreover, the Chilean 
delegation emphasized the importance of giving higher social and cultural value to women’s 
domestic work. Furthermore, they underlined the importance of promoting policies that 
incentivize men to share the family and domestic responsibilities with women. The 
delegation also confirmed its support of legislative efforts to enforce the equality of economic 
opportunity between men and women (UN 1995). 
In June of 2000 a five-year review of the implementation of the Platform for Action was held 
in the UN General Assembly. Every participating country was asked to account for the 
progress made on the implementation of the norms agreed upon in 1995. For addressing of 
the norms concerning ‘Women and the Economy’8 Chile had ratified two Conventions of the 
International Organization of Labour, namely 103 and 156, the former referring to the 
protection of maternity and the latter equality of treatment of women and men at the 
workplace. Moreover, various legislative measures had been taken; Law 19.250
9
 (1993) 
which was directed to establish women’s equal access to employment and to end the previous 
prohibition for women to access certain types of occupations. Law 19.505 (1997) gives a 
special permit for a mother or a father
10
 to be absent from the workplace in case of serious 
illness of her/his underage child. And law 19.585 (1998) modified the rules in the Labour 
Code, namely prohibiting employers to condition female employment on the absence of 
pregnancy (UN 2000:17). 
On the ten-year review in 2005, further measures had been taken in terms of programs for 
gender equality. Specifically SERNAM had created employment and productive development 
programs for women heads of households. The policies were directed to the poorest groups of 
women to reduce the unemployment level and enhance their ability to earn a stable income 
(UN 2005:14). 
                                                          
8
 In this thesis I just address a few of the norms concerning ‘Women and the Economy’ in the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, namely, legislation of equal pay and opportunity between men and women 
and legislation against discrimination based on sex or women’s maternity role. 
9
 Law 19.250 is dated from 30th of September 1993 hence this legislative measure was taken before the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in 1995. 
10
 The previous law regulating this issue, Law 19.250, only gave that permit to the father in case of death of the 
mother. 
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The rhetorical and normative advances in terms of women’s economic rights and their 
integration on the labour market also resulted in de facto progress, however, it was moderate. 
In 1990 the ratio of female to male of the working-age population that actively engages in the 
labour market, by either working or actively looking for work, was 0,418. In year 2000 it was 
0,474; and in 2005 it was 0,524 (UNDP 2012). In 2006, 37% of the female population was 
active on the labour market while almost double, 70%, of the men were active. Furthermore, 
the Global Gender Gap Report also accounts for ‘Wage Equality for Similar Work’ on a scale 
were 1=equality and 0=inequality, and in 2006 Chile was ascribed the score 0.50
11
, hence just 
in between absolute equality and absolute inequality (Global Gender Gap Report 2006:49). 
In concordance with the norm diffusion theory of Finnemore and Sikkink, and their 
assumption that new norms are adopted when the elite’s legitimacy is threatened (Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998: 906), Pinochet ratified the CEDAW just before the referendum took place. 
This was due to wide international and national pressure on his regime, furthermore, the norm 
of formal equality between women and men had already reached the ‘tipping point’ 
internationally (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:901). Thus, the norm cascade had already taken 
place in the democratic states in international society, which made the international pressure 
more legitimate and a more crucial issue for Pinochet. The return to democracy implied 
expanded political rights and civil freedom, which in Chile, as previously mentioned, resulted 
in the return to a strong party system, which also absorbed civil society and movement 
activists into its machinery. Hence, the change of regime type implicated more advocacy 
power to political parties and professional NGOs, and consequently the activities of civil 
society/women’s movements declined. In this way the domestic norm entrepreneurs for 
women’s rights were to a great extent incorporated into the state machinery, and therefore, 
the agenda of the norm entrepreneurs of women’s rights was conditioned by the agenda of the 
political parties. Despite the fact that Chile transformed from a not free regime to a free 
regime, the political and economic structure established by Pinochet however remained 
strong. The new norms concerning women and the economy in the PIOM were at least 
partially in line with the norms established in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action. The international norms of women’s wider integration on the labour market, equal 
pay for women and men and incentivizing the sharing of family responsibilities, were in 
congruence and had a high level of fit, at least rhetorically, with the domestic norms in Chile. 
The market oriented neoliberal regime defined women’s integration on the labour market as a 
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 The sample average in the Global Gender Gap Report is 0.64. 
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condition for Chile’s wider integration on the international market. Thus, in the PIOM 
women’s integration on the labour market was first and foremost a tool for a higher 
productivity and efficiency of the Chilean economy. Accordingly, the localization of the 
international norms related to women and the economy was relatively easy. These types of 
norms and rights had a cultural fit into the Chilean neoliberal agenda and the norm 
entrepreneurs were the governmental actors themselves. And they framed their advocacy by 
the logic that increased gender equality and female participation on the labour market would 
greatly benefit the Chilean economy.  
Furthermore, the recommendations and norms in Beijing were very well adapted and 
reconstructed to fit into the Chilean economic system. The programs initiated by SERNAM 
were directed to poor women, especially women head of households; hence, they were not 
universal policies of gender equality but instead targeted to a specific group. These kinds of 
policies of ‘gender equality’ were a necessary measure for addressing those women who were 
most negatively affected by the neoliberal structural adjustment policies implemented by the 
government (Alvarez 1999:191). Thus, la Concertación and SERNAM managed to graft and 
reinterpret (Acharya 2004:244) these international ideas and make them fit with the Chilean 
economic agenda. By calling the programs of SERNAM gender equality measures, the 
Chilean government enhanced its international and national prestige and legitimacy. 
However, the government achieved legitimacy without having to address some of the 
underlying causes of gender inequality and poverty; namely the neoliberal structural 
adjustments (Alvarez 1999:191). Instead, ‘gender policies’ and programs were used to 
alleviate the negative consequences of such adjustments, thus the theory of localization fits 
very well into how la Concertación integrated international norms into the Chilean domestic 
context. Following the three assumptions by the localization theory: First, the norms were 
adopted for instrumental reasons (to increase Chilean economic productivity and for 
achieving national and international legitimacy). Second, only the characteristics of the 
norms which fitted into the local context were adopted (institutional change was made and 
included new tasks and goals, but many of the policies were targeted to alleviate the negative 
consequences of neoliberal structural adjustments). Third, the localization of the norms 
enhanced Chilean legitimacy without having to forsake prior beliefs and practices (for 
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example not addressing the structural causes of inequality, like the neoliberal SAPs
12
) 
(Acharya 2004:245).  
In conclusion, the IV1, regime type, seems to be related to the outcome in Chile. After 
transforming into a ‘Free Regime’ more international norms were localized. On the contrary, 
regarding ideology (IV2); neoliberal state ideology does not seem, at least on the level of 
discourse, to be an obstacle to the localization of norms concerning women’s integration to 
the labour market and the equality of opportunity of women and men in the economy.
13
 The 
third independent variable, organized religion, does not appear to be a determinant factor in 
the localization of these types of norms. 
 
8.1.2 Women in Power and Decision Making  
Before and during the transition, women activists advocated for the inclusion of more women 
into the democratic process, the tool to get there was, according to many feminist activists, 
the implementation of affirmative action and quotas (Walsh 2012:1336). Besides, in the late 
80’s women activists framed their demands by the logic that the incorporation of more 
women in the political sphere would result in a more non-authoritarian debate and in an 
innovation in ways of organizing society (Franceschet 2004:518). The centre and left parties 
did include some of the feminist demands in their agendas and a few known feminists 
activists ran as candidates (Ríos Tobar 2003:265). But due to the return to the strong party-
system, women were pressured into party lines which compromised their radical claims. And 
furthermore, they were a minority since they only occupied 12-14% of national party offices 
(Walsh 2012:1336). One of the demands being compromised, and already rejected from the 
hosting parties, was mandatory quotas for women in politics. Although the left and the centre 
parties
14
 implemented internal quotas, they did not support affirmative action measures in 
popular elections (Franceschet 2004:526). 
Another obstacle to women’s incorporation into political power and decision-making was the 
electoral system. And, since the Constitution was not amended after the transition, the 
electoral law established by Pinochet was still applied. The functioning of the Chilean 
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 Structural Adjustment Programs 
13
 Note that the meaning of localization is to adapt a norm to local conditions and interests, it does not however 
account for the outcome of implementing these norms in practice. 
14
 Socialist Party 30%, Party for Democracy 40% and Christian Democratic Party 20% (Htun 2002, p. 5). 
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electoral law results in a binominal system, with two blocs to choose from, thus the outcome 
is a bipartisan system (Olavarría 2003:22). Moreover, this leads to a highly competitive 
process within the party coalitions when nominating candidates, and in turn contention is 
unfavourable for female candidates (Fernandéz Ramil 2008:2). In general proportional 
electoral systems serve women’s access to political power better, especially in big electoral 
districts, since the political parties then have an incentive to promote a variety of candidates, 
both female and male (Htun 2010:4).  
The incorporation of women in politics and decision making was stated to be one of the 
primary goals in the PIOM. The plan accounts for the low participation of women in 
instances of power; in 1990 only 5.8% were women in the Chamber of Deputies and only 
6.4% in the Senate (SERNAM 1994: 55). The plan highlights the importance of increasing 
the number of women in decision making positions, not only for exercising their rights to 
equal opportunity, but also to reach the ‘tipping point’ that will change the stereotypes of men 
and women and bring new topics into debate (ibid:56). Furthermore, the electoral system is 
singled out as one of the obstacles for women’s incorporation in political power positions. 
And the plan recommends studies of possible modifications of the law and of the modalities 
of designing candidates. Moreover, the plan sets as a goal to study the affirmative action 
measures taken by some parties and public institutions to assess the advantages and 
possibilities to expand the application of these measures (ibid:57). 
 In the Chilean official statement in Beijing it was declared that it was “increasingly 
necessary to foster appropriate measures to invest women with access to leadership positions, 
through affirmative action” (UN 1995). In addition, the statement was in line with PIOM in 
underlining how women’s participation in power and decision-making would change the way 
of practicing politics, and furthermore, speed up the achievement of world peace and 
development.  
On the five-year appraisal of the Beijing Conference Chile accounted for its progress of 
women in power and decision-making; from 1990 to 1997 the percentage of women in 
parliament had increased with a few percentages, and in the public sector women were in 
1997 representing 42.8% of all intermediate, professional and administrative positions. In 
terms of quotas and affirmative action no legislative measures had been taken. However, the 
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three main centre and left parties were still applying internal affirmative action measures,
15
 
which had increased the number of women on intermediate positions (UN 2000:19). The 
Chilean representative highlighted the difficulties of reforming the electoral law; a bill on 
introducing quotas in the Congress had been presented, but even the parties applying internal 
quotas rejected affirmative action in popular elections. However that may be, the Chilean 
representative confirmed the commitment to continue to work for the approbation of the bill 
on quotas for women (UN 2000:19). 
In the ten-year appraisal no advancements had been made regarding legislation on quotas or 
amending the electoral law. A bill from 1997 had been resubmitted in 2003 and proposed 
political parties to adopt measures to assure that neither of the sexes holds more than 60% of 
the positions within the party. Furthermore, neither of the sexes should exceed 60% on the 
party candidate lists for popular elections (UN 2005:18). Additionally, SERNAM was 
promoting studies of the possibilities of introducing a quota law, and held seminars 
throughout Chile to promote a favourable climate for a legislative reform (ibid). 
Although no legislative reforms were carried through 1995 – 2005, women’s political 
empowerment was developing progressively; women occupied 7.5% of the seats in 
parliament 1997 (IPU 1997), and in 2006 women occupied 15% of the seats (Global Gender 
Gap Report 2006:49). The general score of Chile on Women’s Political Empowerment was 
0.109.
16
 Taking that result into proportion; the highest ranked and most equal country, 
Sweden, scored 0.5501, and the highest ranked South American country was Argentina with 
the score 0.2044 (Global Gender Gap Report 2006:11). 
The norms and recommendations of affirmative action and quotas did not have the same level 
of apparent fit into the Chilean domestic structure as did the norms of women’s economic 
empowerment. Consequently, the scope of framing and making the recommendations 
congruent with domestic interests were not very favourable (Acharya 2004:244). However, 
the discourse and declarations in the PIOM, and the official governmental statement in 
Beijing, acknowledge the necessity of quotas and of reforming the electoral law.  Yet, in 
practice status quo remained unchanged, and the recommended measures did not achieve 
wide support outside the circles of SERNAM. This despite of the fact that 11 other Latin 
American countries applied affirmative action measures in popular elections (Htun 2002:7). 
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 The Socialist Party, the Party for Democracy and the Christian Democratic Party. 
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 0=strict inequality, 1=strict equality. 
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Regionally the norm cascade had already taken place, and Chile was one of the few 
democratic Latin American countries not following the UN recommendation. Thus, the 
international logic of appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891), in the form 
of affirmative action measures, did not have a disruptive discharge in Chile.  
Quotas and electoral law reform did not have a wide support from within the parties; surveys 
showed a wide opposition to quotas among the political elite. Oppositional parliamentarians 
claimed that the implementation of quotas would be against the natural process of achieving 
more equality, and further, quotas would not be in line with the important and preferred 
requirement of merit (Fernández Ramil 2008:3). Likewise, the level of cultural match
17
 in 
legal terms was low (Acharya 2004:243), since reforming the electoral law implicated to 
amend the Constitution of Chile.
18
 Nevertheless, public opinion polls showed that the general 
public had a positive posture to women in power and politics (Fernández Ramil 2008:3). 
Due to the decline of the women’s movement after the transition no norm entrepreneurs 
pressured for the implementation of these measures. Accordingly, the lack of localization of 
these norms can partially be ascribed to the weakness of civil society and women’s 
movements. Since there were no sufficiently strong norm entrepreneurs within the 
Government, or in the political parties in the opposition, a strong civil society movement 
would have been necessary for putting pressure on the government to implement these 
measures. Thus, the regime type in Chile, a free and democratic system, indirectly had 
negative effects on the localization of these norms. This is due to the fact that the return to 
democracy, and a strong party system, provoked a decrease in advocacy power and 
mobilization of women’s movements. Therefore, the conclusion is that the features of 
democratic Chile were unfavourable to this type of gender issues, since they contributed to 
weakening the capacity of the domestic norm entrepreneurs.
19
 Htun and Weldon make the 
same assumption in their framework; in terms of gender status policies
20
 women’s groups are 
extremely important in pressuring governments to put these kinds of measures into practice 
(Htun and Weldon 2007:12). Furthermore, when there is not a strong ideological or doctrinal 
opposition to a norm, but just a lack of political will, a strong movement of norm 
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Legal cultural match would mean that the international norms were congruent with the Chilean legal system, 
and therefore relatively ‘easy’ to implement.  
18
 The military Constitution written during the dictatorship was not even amended after the transition to 
democracy. 
19
 Capacity of norm entrepreneurs is one of the intervening variables in this thesis. 
20
 Policies directed to all women as a group, like for example quotas. 
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entrepreneurs would have a good chance of being successful in pressuring the political elite 
to localize the norm. 
To conclude, the type of norm/issue seems to be a key factor when explaining how the 
absence of localization contradicts the first hypothesis about regime type. According to the 
first hypothesis, Chile, as a free and democratic regime, would be likely to localize norms of 
gender equality. But the type of norms; quotas and electoral law reform, did not resonate very 
well in the political parties, and on top of that the women’s movement was extremely weak, 
indirectly due to the regime type in Chile. Thus, there were no ‘strong’21 norm entrepreneurs 
within the government, or from civil society, to frame, graft and highlight the benefits of 
quotas in Chilean society. Even though left-wing parties have a greater tendency to support 
and implement quotas (Franceschet 2004:526, Htun 2002:6), the ‘unwillingness’ to 
implement quotas and reform the electoral law did not strictly follow ideological patterns, but 
was widely spread within the political elite (Fernández Ramil 2008:3). Organized religion 
(IV3) does not seem to play an important role in this case. 
 
8.1.3 Women and Health – Reproductive Rights  
In the 80’s when the women’s movement still was relatively strong, different groups of 
organized women demanded the decriminalization of abortion and expanded reproductive 
rights. The Federation of Socialist Women advocated for reproductive freedom including 
abortion, but as women were incorporated into the state machinery and into the professional 
NGOs, they lost their autonomy. Many radical claims were compromised, especially those 
regarding reproductive rights (Franceschet 2004:524, 525).  
However, before 1989 therapeutic abortion
22
 was legal in Chile, but just before leaving the 
power Pinochet criminalized all types of abortions, including abortions to save a woman’s 
life and abortions in case of rape (Blofield 2001:7).  
The negotiated transition contributed to circumspection of the centre and left parties in terms 
of bringing polemical issues to the table, especially issues such as abortion and contraception 
measures.  The Catholic Church and the political right achieved a lot of bargaining power as 
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 ‘Strong’: in the sense of possessing power of persuasion and influence. 
22
  Therapeutic abortions are carried through when the pregnancy is endangering the woman’s life. 
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a result of the transition; the right-wing parties partially due to the mediated character of the 
transition, and the Catholic Church in part due to its opposition to the Pinochet regime and its 
support of human rights during the dictatorship (Walsh 2012:1326). Furthermore the leading 
party in la Concertación, the Christian Democratic Party, was well connected with the 
Catholic Church. Moreover, since the Constitution of 1980 was not amended, many 
authoritarian features remained in the political system. These features were nine non-elected 
senators, the previously mentioned electoral law and certain institutions possessing veto 
power over the legislature (Olavarría 2003:11). In the Senate nine of the senators are 
designated and this authoritarian design was meant to favour the right. The bills passed by the 
Chamber of Deputies must be passed in the Senate, and the appointed Senators
23
 always pact 
with the right, therefore those senators and the right wing parties form a veto-block together. 
Hence, this characteristic of the political system is one more factor enforcing the advantage 
and bargaining power of the right wing parties (Blofield 2001:13).  
The Catholic Church in Chile has taken a very active position in terms of opposing abortion. 
The issue is an important part of the Church doctrine on the family, and the policy is strict 
‘pro-life’24 under any circumstances (Blofield 2001:24, 41). Moreover the Catholic Church is 
strongly connected and intertwined with religious interest groups, political parties, business 
groups and the media. The conservative rights-wing parties; la UDI and la RN, strongly 
identify with the moral doctrine of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, religious interest 
groups like Opus Dei and the Legionaries are strong advocates for the maintenance of strict 
doctrinal morality, hence absolute prohibition of abortion. These groups are moreover well 
connected to corporate interests; to the right-wing-dominated media, and on the top of that, 
they are owners of several elitist Universities and of well funded think tanks (Blofield 
2001:26, 28, 35). This well connected red has contributed to make abortion a priority issue 
for the right in Chile. Since they have access to media and research, big media campaigns are 
launched every time the issue of abortion and reproductive rights is brought to the table. The 
right-influenced media is framing the debate and abortion is depicted as ‘baby killing’ and 
‘homicide’. Furthermore, mothers dying from their pregnancies are embraced as martyrs 
(Blofield 2001:20, 39, 42).  
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 They are appointed by typically right wing institutions; namely the National Security Council, The Supreme 
Court and the President of the Republic. They are also called ‘institutionalized senators’.  
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 ‘Pro-life’: as in strict opposition to abortion and contraceptive measures. 
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Prior to the Beijing Conference in 1995 the Catholic Church, the right-wing parties, Opus Dei 
and some parliamentarians from the Christian Democratic Party went into a discursive battle 
with SERNAM concerning the approbation of PIOM and the elaboration of the Chilean 
official statement in Beijing (Alvarez 2000:19; Grau, Olea and Peréz 2000:20, Franceschet 
2007:11). Their first preoccupation was how the issue of reproductive rights should be 
approached. The Cardinal of Santiago demanded that a representative from the Church had to 
be present in all SERNAM’s discussions regarding the elaboration of the Chilean statement 
(Grau, Olea and Peréz 2000: 22). The Church and the right wing commanded a strict pro-life 
position of Chile in the UN Conference (Alvarez 2000:19). 
Contrarily to the active approach of the Church and the right, the Chilean left and the feminist 
movement
25
 remained silent in this debate; and a kind of ‘discursive accommodation’26 
(Alvarez 2000:20; Grau, Olea and Peréz 2000:97) and self-censorship took place. This 
happened despite of the fact that illegal abortions were a big social and economic problem. 
Only in Cuba, where abortion is legal, the abortion rates are higher than in Chile, hence 
thousands (120 000 – 175 000) of illegal abortions are carried out each year. It is estimated 
that one third of all women who die during pregnancy die from complications caused by 
illegal abortions; and the costs of this social problem is estimated to be 15 million dollars 
only in 1996 (Blofield 2001:15, 16). Moreover, it is a social problem that almost 
indiscriminately affects poor and working class women, since they do not have access to 
resources to pay for ‘safe’ illegal abortions. Thereby, poor women are also the majority in 
terms of being prosecuted for illegal abortions (ibid: 15, 16). Additionally, several public 
opinion polls show that the there is a positive attitude towards legalizing abortion in Chile; 
especially in situations of rape
27
 and danger of the mother’s life28 (Blofield 2001:19). Thus, 
the regressive values of the Church and the political right are not representative for the 
Chilean public opinion. 
The Chilean statement in Beijing was completely in line with the commands of the Church 
and the political right. Accordingly, the minister of women’s affairs, Josefina Bilbao, assured 
Chile’s commitment to the improvements of women’s health in general, but underlined that 
Chile will not accept a “reopening of the debate on the topics of reproductive health and 
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abortion” (UN 1995). Furthermore, she emphasized that Chile rejects the right to abortion but 
is in favour of family planning methods that are not “contravening a higher ethical standard” 
(UN1995).  
Despite the overwhelming statistics on the consequences of illegal abortions, and regardless 
of the international recommendations; the Chilean delegation did not even mention 
reproductive rights or abortion in the official statement in the 5-year appraisal of Beijing. The 
topic was not brought up in terms of successful policies and neither in challenges or 
initiatives for the future (UN 2000:14). 
In the ten year appraisal the Chilean delegation stated that one third of all maternal deaths 
still were due to illegal abortions (UN 2005:8). To counter the problem programs and 
initiatives of ‘Responsible Sexuality’ and ‘Policy of Sexual Education’ had been launched; 
furthermore a draft on a law
29
 on sexual and reproductive rights had been submitted by a 
group of parliamentarians. One important progress had been made in 2004; victims of rape in 
reproductive age had been conceded the right to be informed about, and given access to, the 
emergency contraceptive pill
30
 (UN 2005:9). In the end of the paragraph on ‘women and 
health’ the Chilean delegate recognizes “the need to deal with the public health problem 
represented by abortion, especially abortions conducted under unsafe circumstances. The 
quality of care for complications arising from abortion will have to be improved, and those 
who have undergone such procedures must be treated humanely” (UN 2005:10). 
As assumed by Finnemore and Sikkink, some international women’s rights norms will enter 
in hard competition with domestic norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:894), and in the case 
of Chile, the international norms of reproductive rights seem to have a low level of fit into the 
Chilean domestic structure. The domestic opposition to the international norms had a solid 
organizational platform; a societal power-red including the Church, the political right, 
corporate interests, organized religious groups and the media. This red completely out-ruled 
all possibilities for national or international norm entrepreneurs’ to make their claim for 
abortion and reproductive rights. Specific traditional and conservative features in the Chilean 
society were safeguarded by a relatively small, but economically and politically strong elite. 
This organized group took on the local agency role being a strong ‘norm rejecter’ instead of 
norm taker (Acharya 2004:240).  
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Due to institutional arrangements inherited from the dictatorship and the right wing 
dominance over the media and public discourse, it was impossible for women’s rights 
entrepreneurs, within or outside the state, to find a scope of framing and highlighting the 
importance of women’s reproductive rights. This in combination with a generally passive role 
of the political left on the issue, partially owing to the coalition arrangement between the left 
parties and the Christian Democratic Party and the latter’s close ties to the Catholic Church.  
In sum; the first hypothesis regarding regime type does not seem to have much support in this 
case. In defiance of Chile being classified as a free state which, according to H1, would be 
more likely to localize international norms, a total rejection of this type of norm took place. 
Moreover, although Chile being classified as a Free State (Freedom House 1998), domestic 
mechanisms and features indirectly debilitates civil society actors and their capacity of 
influence. In addition, institutional arrangements and informal networks contribute to a bias 
in favour of the political right and the Church in terms of setting the agenda. Therefore, the 
second independent variable, ideology, seems to be at play in this case. The neoliberal 
character of the Chilean state has peculiarities; being economically liberal it is still, however, 
socially conservative. Since the socially conservative interest groups have close ties to the 
corporate interests, the neoliberal ideology of the state, appears to be indirectly averse to the 
localization of this type of women’s rights norm. At last, in line with the argument of Htun 
and Weldon, in Chile, organized religion is the most determinant domestic factor in terms of 
localization (or the lack of it) of international norms on women’s reproductive rights. 
 
8.2 Political Context Venezuela 
The global energy crisis hit most countries already in the 70’s; however, due to its rich oil 
revenue, Venezuela resisted the crisis until the beginning of the 80’s (Fierro and Lander 
1996:50). More precisely, in 1983 Venezuela was also declared to be in crisis and many 
economists called for structural reforms to uphold and sustain the economy (Rakowski 
2003:389). In 1989 the Social Democratic Government
31
 of Venezuela introduced a 
neoliberal package of structural adjustments to counter the economic crisis. The neoliberal 
adjustments lead to growing inequalities, extreme income concentration, inflation, 
unemployment, and furthermore living-, health- and nutrition conditions were deteriorating 
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dramatically (Fierro and Lander 1996:66). The  economic conditions remained during both 
the 80’s and the 90’s. 
Despite the degenerating economic situation in Venezuela women’s rights activists were very 
active and innovative in their struggle for equality between women and men. In 1985 several 
different women’s rights NGOs came together to establish the Coordinating Committee of 
Non-Governmental Organizations of Women, CONG (Friedman 1999:14). It was established 
with the intention to unify women from all different sectors and to counter the co-option of 
civil society movements by political parties. The functioning of the CONG was based on 
non-hierarchical decision-making and decentralization, (Friedman 1999:15) this to attract as 
many women as possible. CONG was indeed integrated by a variety of women; feminists, 
academics, politicians, lawyers, journalists, women from the working class, and moreover, 
women from conservative groups. Their primary goal was legislative change and 
implementation, and from 1985 up until beginning of the 90’s CONG could, in a coordinated 
way, advocate for and launch campaigns on different issues concerning women’s rights 
(Espina and Rakowski 2006:5). 
The neoliberal structural adjustments in 1989 led to instability all over the country. In 1992 
the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200
32
 carried through a coup attempt directed at the 
sitting government responsible for implementing the structural reforms. The coup attempt 
failed but it was led by the future President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez Frias (Espina and 
Rakowski 2006:1).  
The consequences of the structural adjustments and the coup attempts also affected the unity 
of the women’s movements, and specifically the unity of CONG. The organization was 
seriously divided over which side to take during the coup attempts (Friedman 1999:23). The 
same year the National Council of Women, CONAMU,
33
 was created and a few salient 
women from the CONG were selected to be a part of its directorate (Espina and Rakowski 
2006:7). This further divided the CONG; some members of the organization considered this 
new tendency to be the same as giving in to the patriarchal state, while others saw it as a 
strategic alliance between feminists, femocrats and political party activists. The latter group, 
the so called the CORE Group (Espina and Rakowski 2002:6), was more salient and it 
brought the women’s struggle into a new path. The new organizational base of the women’s 
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rights activists was now the governmental and parliamentarian instances. This domestic 
process was parallel and interrelated with the increased international funding available for 
women’s NGOs in Latin America. During the preparation process to the Beijing Conference 
CONG received funds both from the state and from international agencies. Critics claimed 
that NGOs changed their agenda to be eligible for funding, and that they adapted to the plan 
of the government and international agencies (Rakowski 2003:394).  
In 1993 the population of Venezuela showed that they had lost their confidence the Social 
Democratic Government, due to the profound negative consequences of the structural 
adjustments its legitimacy had gone lost. The Christian Democratic and ideologically 
conservative party
34
 won the elections and Rafael Caldera was the new President (Fierro and 
Lander 1996:68).  
On this wise, the Beijing Conference came at a time when the women’s movement in 
Venezuela was divided and saw some of its demands being compromised. Moreover, the new 
Christian Democratic Government had a traditional and conservative value-base. Further, 
Venezuela found itself in the deepest economic crisis of the country’s history. 
 
8.2.1 Women and the Economy  
Due to the economic crisis and the induced structural adjustments, the living standards 
deteriorated dramatically in Venezuela. From 1984 to 1994 the percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line increased from 36% to 66%, and the part of the population 
living below the extreme poverty line increased from 11% to 36% (Fernandes 2007:106). The 
economic package applied in 1989 connoted a turn from a state-directed economy to an 
extreme economic liberalization, and the market was seen as being the ‘objective’ force that 
would conduct the economy and the country in the right direction (Fierro and Landers 
1996:51). Some of the implications of this were restrictions on public spending, reduced 
wage levels and reduced price controls (Fierro and Landers 1996:52). The result on the 
labour market was very high levels of unemployment.  
In spite of the critical economic situation, progress was being made in terms of gender 
equality; in 1990 a reform of the Labour Law took place. The bill was developed by CONG, 
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the Ministry of the Family and certain parliamentarians (Espina and Rakowski 2002:15). The 
amendment of the law provided protection of working mothers; prohibited pregnancy tests 
prior to employment, and pregnant women were conceded the right to abstain from working 
tasks that could be prejudicial to the health of the woman or the child (Ley Orgánica de 
Trabajo).
35
 This reform, as mentioned, was achieved through coordinated action between 
members of the core group of CONG, the executive and legislative branch, hence the norm 
entrepreneurs could be found within and outside the government (Espina and Rakowski 
2002:9). 
While the labour law reform was progress, setbacks were more common in this period. In the 
Law on Equal Opportunities for Women from 1992, it was established that a permanent 
National Women’s Agency should be created, but the new President Rafael Caldera chose to 
not comply with the law and instead re-decree CONAMU (Friedman 1999:30). This was an 
impediment because the National Women’s Agency was to be endowed with more executive 
capacity than CONAMU. 
In the official statement in Beijing the Venezuelan representative addressed the problem of 
poverty and the structural adjustments. This issue was defined as one of the biggest obstacles 
to women’s economic integration and participation on the labour market. And a primary 
concern for Venezuela was the incorporation of women into the labour market and to 
improve the global plan for achieving this goal. Moreover, Venezuela exhorted vigorous 
actions to incorporate women in the labour market “under conditions that allow them to 
perform as fully responsible citizens and thus be entitled to the benefits of their efforts” (UN 
1995). 
The economic crisis was still going strong after the mid 90’s and in 1998 the World Bank 
classified Venezuela as the country with the highest levels of inequality in all of Latin 
America (Rakowski 2003:389). The provision of public services was deteriorating since the 
80’s and this attracted foreign funding to national NGOs providing different social services 
(Espina and Rakowski 2002:8). The poorest women, who were depending on these social 
services, were consequently those who provided their labour force to the NGOs, some for a 
small retribution but mostly voluntarily. In this way their daily struggle for survival became 
institutionalized and the public welfare was privatized (Fernandes 2007:107). 
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Before the five year appraisal, namely in late 1998, the presidential elections took place, and 
Hugo Chavez Frias was elected as the new President. This connoted big changes in the 
political, economic and social structure in Venezuela. In times of crisis Chavez represented 
hope and change, and not the least, many women were very active in his campaign 
(Fernandes 207:108). In power, Chavez initiated the Pacific and Socialist Bolivarian 
Revolution (Espina and Rakowski 2006:8) and immediately he started the project of rewriting 
the Constitution (Rakowski 2003:390). At first Chavez was not engaged in issues of gender 
equality, moreover, his first cabinet was formed by only men. But some of the women’s 
rights activists in the remaining core group of CONG, had also been active in the guerrilla 
movement of Chavez in the early 90’s, and therefore, he listened to their demands (Espina 
and Rakowski 2006:9). Furthermore, they educated him on gender issues and suggested 
female candidates for high administrative positions (ibid). And in 2000 by presidential decree 
Hugo Chavez created the permanent National Women’s Agency, INAMujer,36 as prescribed 
by the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women from 1992 (Rakowski 2003:398). 
Thus, on the five-year appraisal in New York, Venezuela was presided by a Socialist 
Government. Therefore, the approach and analysis of the causes of gender inequality looked 
quite different from 1995. But the questionnaire sent out by the UN was responded to already 
in March 1999; hence, the progress or regression made until then had to be ascribed to the 
Caldera administration. In terms of women and the economy, poverty was still the 
predominate issue. To counter the problem of poverty the government had started projects of 
micro-enterprise workshops for indigenous and peasant women, which was also funded by 
international institutions (UN 2000:3). Moreover, the structural reforms were still defined as 
having a profound negative impact on women’s lives; and this by leading to unemployment, 
poverty, and increased employment on the informal market. These issues affected women 
more than men, thus widening the inequality between the genders on the labour market (UN 
2000:7).  
On the ten-year follow up in 2005 the new Constitution had been applied for five years. To 
counter the structural, as well as the discursive causes of women’s subordination, the new 
Bolivarian Constitution used a non-sexist and non-discriminatory language. Furthermore, in 
terms of women and the economy, as the first Constitution in the world, it recognized 
domestic work as a generator of added value, creating income and social welfare 
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(INAMUJER 2008). Since 1999 the Socialist Government had implemented a series of 
policies for creating more employment and it had conceded thousands of micro-credits to 
improve the quality of life for women (UN 2005:5). The micro-credits were given by the new 
Bank for Women, Banco de la Mujer, and were supposed to help poor women’s development 
and their capacity of self-sustainability (UN 2005:6). The Venezuelan delegation also made 
clear that one of its primary goals was to equalize the distribution of resources, between all 
peoples, and specifically between women and men.   
In terms of legislation, groundbreaking progress was made in Venezuela. Recognizing 
domestic work as an economic activity was an important step forward for women. And 
conceding them the right to social security (Constitución de la República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela 1999: art, 88) provided a guarantee of higher living standards. Furthermore, the 
new Constitution guaranteed equal wage for equal work between women and men (ibid, art 
91). Moreover, through social state programs, community soup kitchens and committees were 
created (Fernandes 2007:109). These state programs could be seen as a continuation of the 
institutionalization of women’s struggle instated during the Perez and Caldera 
administrations. But simultaneously the Bolivarian programs were designed differently and 
food preparation was increasingly seen as a job in the poor neighbourhoods (ibid: 118), thus 
ascribing a higher social value to women’s work. Furthermore, the Chavez administration 
made big efforts to reverse the neoliberal austerity measures providing a large variety of 
social welfare services throughout the country, thereby alleviating the burden on women 
(ibid:122). 
The statistics also show increasing female participation on the labour market during the 
Chavez administration, specifically higher levels than in Chile. In 1990 the ratio of female to 
male of the working-age population that actively engaged in the labour market, by either 
working or actively looking for work, was 0,462. In 2000 it was 0,590; and in 2005 it was 
0,632, while in Chile the ratio 2005 was 0,524 (UNDP 2012). In 2006 57% of the women 
were active on the labour market while 83% of the men were active. As accounted for earlier 
in the text, the Global Gender Gap Report estimates the ‘Wage Equality for Similar Work’ on 
a scale were 1=equality and 0=inequality, and Venezuela is ascribed the score 0.62
37
, a high 
score in comparison with Chile’s 0,50 (Global Gender Gap Report 2006:141). 
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Before and after the election of Chavez, these types of norms seem to have had a resonance in 
the domestic context of Venezuela. Already before the Beijing Summit, domestic norm 
entrepreneurs from the core group of CONG cooperated with insider women’s rights 
activists, namely women in the executive and in the parliament. One achievement was the 
reform of the Labour Law. As the norms concerning women and the economy were norms 
that could be considered as norms of equality of opportunity, typically they resonated well 
with neoliberal Venezuela as well as with Bolivarian Venezuela. The difference lies in the 
way the international norms were localized. Although, the Caldera administration continued 
on the path of formal legal recognition of women’s economic and labour rights,38 it did not 
take measures to practically counter the causes of inequality. And this in defiance of, both in 
Beijing 1995 and in the UN questionnaire 1999,  recognizing the neoliberal SAP’s as causes 
of the deterioration of women’s general life conditions, and their inequality with men.  
When Chavez came to power he drastically changed the normative order through rewriting 
the Constitution. The new Constitution established equality as one of the fundamental 
principles of Bolivarian Venezuela (Garcia n.d1:14), and the emphasis on equality resonated 
well with international norms of gender equality. Thus, the local fit and cultural match 
(Acharya 2004:243) of the UN norms was enhanced and enforced by the change of 
government and state ideology. Furthermore, the international norms were adapted and 
reinterpreted to fit into the socialist political project; hence, to rhetorically support socialist 
reforms. State funded programs for the economic empowerment of women were put into 
practice, addressing gender, class and race inequalities concurrently. The constitutional 
recognition of the value of women’s domestic work, and their right to social security, was 
pioneering also in the context of international norms. The norm entrepreneurs were Chavez 
himself, his administration and the core group of ex CONG and guerrilla members who were 
close to him. Furthermore, the women with close ties to Chavez involved women’s rights 
activists from other fields, in the process of formulating and advocating for new policies and 
norms (Espina and Rakowski 2006:9). 
To conclude; IV1, regime type, does, in this case, not seem to play a determinant role. 
Venezuela is, since Chavez came to power, classified as a partly free regime by Freedom 
House. But still these norms were localized in Venezuela. Furthermore, Venezuela scores 
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higher than the Chile
39
 on both female labour participation and on similar wage for similar 
work between women and men. On the other hand the socialist ideology appears to have a 
positive relation to norms of gender equality; thus the Bolivarian regime includes most UN 
norms on women and the economy in its basic law, as well as in its Constitution. The third 
IV, religion, does not appear to influence the localization of norms of women’s economic 
rights. 
 
8.2.2 Women in Power and Decision Making 
Since the beginning of the 90’s the so called core group of CONG had been cooperating and 
coordinating different legislative activities with women and men in the executive and 
legislative branch (Espina and Rakowski 2002:3). In 1992 the Social Democratic President 
Carlos Peréz established the National Council for Women, CONAMU, it was the first legal 
entity concerning women’s issues. This committee facilitated the cooperation between the 
civil society women rights activists and the femocrats working for the state. The latter 
contracted the former as gender experts giving them power to influence the political process. 
In contrast to Chile, in spite of the women’s movement losing part of its ‘autonomy’, a few 
and important key players in  the movement maintained their power of influence and could 
together with state actors advance in terms of legislation on women’s rights. From the 90’s 
onwards politicians and political parties recognized women as important lobby groups, with 
the capacity of working across party lines when either a favourable opportunity appeared or 
when their already achieved rights were threatened (Rakowski 2003:387). 
In 1993 the Law of Equal Opportunities was established, it laid the ground for the future 
Women’s Institute and electoral quotas. This bill was elaborated by one single woman in the 
parliament supported by women from civil society (Espina and Rakowski 2006:7).  
Venezuela’s electoral system is a mixed system with single member districts and closed lists 
(Htun 2002:7). The first feature tends to have negative effects on women’s chances to get 
elected, since parties invest in the candidate that has the best chance to win, and usually the 
top candidates of parties are men (Htun 2002:6). While the second feature usually has a 
slightly positive effect on the likelihood of women being appointed as candidates, this is due 
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to the fact that the party leader chooses the candidates and the electors vote for the party list 
(ibid).  
On the Beijing Conference the Christian Democratic delegation emphasized the importance 
of incorporating women into the spheres of political power and decision-making. Moreover, 
equal representation of women and men was defined as one of the fundamental elements for 
changing society for the better. The Venezuelan delegation underlined the importance of 
implementing measures to overcome the inequalities between women and men in political 
power, furthermore, integration of women in the state, political parties and public office was 
seen as the only way to achieve a harmonious political development (UN 1995). 
Between 1995 and late 1998
40
 two important headways were made; the partial reform of the 
suffrage law and CONAMU’s National Plan for Women (Espina and Rakowski 2006:7). The 
former established a requirement of at least 30% women on the party lists in popular 
elections. And as previously mentioned, closed party lists and a quota of minimum 30% 
women, indeed contributed to more women gaining office by means of party lists than 
through direct elections 
41
 (Rakowski 2003:396). In 1998 the National Plan for Women was 
approved, CONAMU and a variety of women from civil society cooperated to create the 
plan, and feminist academics helped to write it (ibid).  
In the five-year appraisal questionnaire the Venezuelan delegation confirmed its commitment 
to equality between women and men in political power and decision making (UN 2000:1). It 
accounted for the reform of the suffrage law and the establishment of party quotas in the 
deliberative bodies,
42
 and for the National Women’s Plan. Although improvements had been 
made in terms of female representation in the deliberative bodies, it was far from 30%, at the 
moment of responding to the questionnaire it was only 14% (UN 2000:2). Furthermore, the 
Government had supported and incentivised a study on the electoral law and the possibilities 
of proportional representation of women in the electoral process (ibid).  
1999 Hugo Chavez started the process of rewriting the Constitution, and women’s rights 
activists on the ideological left-side were given extended power of influence; both in the 
content and the formulation of the new basic law (Espina and Rakowski 2002:11). And these 
women, in turn, worked together with women from different instances in society to develop 
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the Bolivarian Constitution (ibid:12). Almost all demands of women since the 70’s were 
included in the new text
43
 (Espina 2001:74). In such manner, women’s opinions were 
incorporated into the highest levels of power, decision making and agenda setting by the new 
socialist Government.  
Since the creation of INAMujer in 2000 several programs and campaigns had been carried 
through, one of them was the campaign of getting women into 50% of the positions of all 
levels of government (Rakowski 2003:400). The argument was that the Bolivarian 
Constitution is based on the principle of full equality, also between men and women. 
Furthermore, Hugo Chavez himself called on the Socialist Party to apply the principle of 
strict equality, meaning 50% women and 50% men (INAMujer 2008).  
In the statement on the ten-year appraisal
44
 the Venezuelan representative accounted for the 
difficulties of making formal rights reality, namely to in practice reach the point were 50% of 
all positions in power and decision making are held by women. Although, aiming for this, the 
Bolivarian Government gave its full support to the campaign 50%/50% (UN 2005:12). 
Moreover, the delegation confirmed Venezuela’s commitment to establish further policies 
and goals to achieve higher levels of gender equality in the decision making processes and to 
improve women’s political opportunities (UN 2005:2).  
In January 1997 5.9% of the Parliamentarians were women (IPU 1997). And in 2006 the 
percentage had increased to 18% (Global Gender Gap Report 2006:141). Hence, the 
percentage in Venezuela in 1997 was below the one of Chile (7.5%), and in 2006 Venezuela 
had reached a higher percentage of women in Parliament than Chile (15%). The former had 
increased the female participation with 12.1%, while latter had accounted for an increment of 
7.5%. The general score of Venezuela in terms of women’s political empowerment was 
0.138
45
 in 2006 (ibid).  
Further progress attributed to the Chavez administration was the politicization and 
engagement in politics of poor women, mostly women participating in the social state 
programs, such as the soup kitchens and the committees (Fernandes 2007:97, Espina and 
Rakowski 2006:11). Due to Chavez’s dedication to improve the life situation of the poorest 
women, many of them started to mobilize in his favour and became more involved in politics, 
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in particular on the local level of their neighbourhoods, but they also mobilized to vote in 
national elections (Fernandes 2007:112).  
In contrast to Chile, the integration of many of the women’s rights activists into the state 
machinery did not entail attenuation in advocacy power of the domestic norm entrepreneurs. 
Instead, women within and outside the state cooperated to achieve their goals, both during the 
Caldera and the Chavez administration. Moreover, the local female norm entrepreneurs 
connected to Chavez achieved legitimacy and prestige due to their prior activism in Chavez’s 
guerrilla movement, which made him both trust them, and to listen to their ideas and 
demands. 
 As for the norms established in Beijing, the ground had already been prepared in Venezuela, 
the Law of Equal Opportunities from 1993 facilitated the future implementation of quotas. 
Thereby, the international norms had a local fit with the domestic norms; hence the 
international and domestic agendas looked very much the same. And the reform of the 
suffrage law in 1997 proved the Venezuelan Government’s willingness to implement the 
international, and the national agenda in the form of quotas.  
The agenda of socialist Hugo Chavez fit even better with the international agenda on gender 
rights, however, not primarily due to the willingness to achieve international legitimacy, but 
instead owing to the socialist ideological project. The emphasis of equality in the Bolivarian 
Constitution facilitated the localization of norms of 50% of women and 50% men in power 
and decision making positions.
46
 Additionally, the international norms were framed to fit well 
into the socialist agenda; gender inequality was connected to class and race inequality, and 
most state programs typically addressed poor women in the shantytowns outside the big cities 
or in the countryside (Fernandes 2007:113).  
Hence, localization took place during both Governments; new institutions and policy 
instruments were created and new goals were set (Acharyra 2004:251). Besides, the 
international and domestic norms were mutually constitutive (ibid). 
In short, regime type does not seem to matter in terms of upgrading women’s political 
empowerment. Some civil and political liberties were slightly restrained after Chavez came to 
power, but that did not confine women activists’ advocacy power. On the contrary, they 
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achieved more power of influence in the Chavez administration. The IV2, ideology, on the 
other hand, seems to matter. Even if the neoliberal and Christian Democratic Government did 
both rhetorically and practically support the localization of international norms; the new 
Socialist Government however took the process one step further. The new basic law was 
written in a gender neutral language, and the socialist Government thereby recognized the 
necessity to address structural causes of gender equality, such as discourse. Furthermore, 
most women’s demands since the 70’s were included in the new Bolivarian Constitution. 
  
8.2.3 Women and Health – Reproductive Rights 
The Venezuelan Criminal Code of 1964 generally prohibits abortion, however, in the case of 
danger to the woman’s life, abortion is legal (UN DESA: 2). These types of abortions can 
only be carried through if a written consent is given by the woman herself, her husband or her 
legal representative. In case of emergency it may suffice with a second opinion from a 
physician (ibid). All other abortions are prohibited, including in case of rape or incest. 
Between 1980 and 1983 24.6% of all maternal deaths were caused by illegal and unsafe 
abortions, while in 1995 the percentage decreased to 13.6 (ibid). 
Already during the 80’s, when CONG was still a unified movement, it was hard to reach an 
agreement about the agenda on abortion and reproductive rights (Espina and Rakowski 
2002:8). The difficulty of unified and collective action on the issue was due the inclusive 
character of the organization; it was composed of women from a variety of sectors in society, 
progressives as well as conservatives. The disagreement on these issues was one of the 
reasons of the degradation of the CONG, and members with a more progressive inclination 
denounced the censorship of topics like sexuality and abortion (Espina and Rakowski 
2006:7). 
The Christian Democratic Government elected in 1993 strongly opposed a further expansion 
of abortion rights. In the Beijing Conference, similar to the position of the Chilean 
representative, the Venezuelan representative objected all formulations of the document’s 
language
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 that could be interpreted as promoting or accepting abortion (Friedman 1999:31). 
In the statement the representative emphasized sexual education as one of the most important 
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ways to prevent early pregnancies while anti-conceptive methods or abortion were not 
mentioned (UN 1995). 
Abortion and contraceptive measures were neither mentioned in the UN questionnaire from 
1999. Although, National Commissions to prevent teenage pregnancies had been created (UN 
2000:3). 
When Chavez came to power the debate about sexuality opened up to some extent; the 
women participating in the elaboration of the new constitutional text included reproductive 
rights in their proposals (Garcia n.d1:4). The women’s movement demanded full sexual and 
reproductive rights,
48
 ranging from protection of motherhood and sexual education, to sexual 
and reproductive health services of high quality (ibid:8). Chavez exhorted all civil society to 
participate in the formulation of the new text, and the Catholic Church together with other 
conservative factions in Venezuelan society also contributed with their proposals (ibid:6). 
One of the biggest preoccupations of the Catholic Church was the issue of abortion. 
Representatives from the Church made strong objections to the issue of removing the tagline 
‘from impregnation’ in article 7449 in the Constitution from 1961. This could, according to 
them, open up for the legalization of abortion (ibid: 11). After lobbying and pressure from the 
Church, the National Constitutive Assembly decided to keep the debated tagline in the 
article
50
 concerning protection of maternity (ibid: 12). 
In 2000 women from INAMujer, NGOs and the Permanent Commission of the Family, 
Women and Youth, presented a draft on reforming the Penal Code. Their aim was to legalize 
abortion in case of rape or incest, however, the draft was not successful (Espina and 
Rakowski 2002:15). 
In the ten year appraisal of the Beijing Conference the Venezuelan representative accounted 
for the strengthening of family planning services, and for the distribution of different anti-
conceptive methods, which furthermore was completely subsidized by the Government (UN 
2005:10). In 2003 the ‘day after pill’ was included in the supply of anti-conceptive methods 
(UN 2005:11), and in this way, progress had been made. However, abortion or the 
consequences of illegal and unsafe abortions was not mentioned in the statement. 
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The Venezuelan case is similar to the Chilean with respect to reproductive rights, and this 
specific issue has for a long time created polemic in Latin America. It is a highly contentious 
matter also between women, and little progress has been made in the last decades. The so 
called norm cascade which would implicate harder international pressure to adopt a norm had 
not taken place regionally. However, Chile and Venezuela both have one of the most 
restricted abortion laws in all Latin America (Htun 2010:20).  
The domestic opposition to abortion, the Catholic Church, was more loud and active than 
those advocating for its liberalization. The level of fit and cultural match of the international 
norms was low, and the scope of making the international ideas congruent with local 
traditions and culture was unfavorable. When participating in the redaction of the 
Constitution, women activists did not even propose the legalization of abortion.  
In summary, regime type and ideology does not seem to matter in Venezuela as for legalizing 
or have an open debate about abortion. Yet, ideology seem to matter as for anti-conceptive 
methods, the Socialist Administration provided anti-conceptive methods for free to all 
women in fertile age. But the IV that seems to largely be at play is religion, as in the case of 
Chile, the religious groups showed capacity to mobilize against the adoption of norms that 
contradicts the doctrinal morality. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I have been assessing the extent to which the domestic context determines the 
localization of transnational norms. Through studying two cases, Chile and Venezuela, I have 
been able to analyze how and to what extent regime type, ideology and organized religion 
interplay with norm localization.  
The research shows that features in the domestic structure to a very large extent condition the 
localization of transnational norms. Furthermore, different norms of gender equality interact 
distinctively with the features in the domestic structure. The theory of localization applies 
well on the two cases and it shows how local norm entrepreneurs in both Chile and 
Venezuela reinterpreted and adjusted international norms to fit into domestic interests and 
agenda. Regarding norms on women’s economic rights the norm entrepreneurs in Chile 
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framed the issue as important for enhancing Chilean productivity and efficiency. Whereas in 
Socialist Venezuela equality between all peoples, and further between women and men, was 
part of the ideological project. Equality between the genders was framed to be interrelated 
with class equality, and on this wise the norm was reinterpreted to be congruent with the 
socialist ideas. This argument can further be demonstrated regarding women’s political 
rights; affirmative action and quotas could not be framed as having an instrumental function 
in Chile’s extremely market oriented economy. Thus, as a state based on political and 
economic neo-liberalism, and therefore lacking the strong ideological conviction that equality 
had a value per se, Chile did not localize the norms of affirmative action and quotas. On the 
other hand, both the Caldera and the Chavez administrations strongly supported quotas, the 
former legislated on 30% women on party lists, while Chavez himself took it one step further 
and advocated for strict equality, 50% women and 50% men. Again women’s rights norms, in 
form of affirmative action measures, fitted well into the socialist notion of the intrinsic value 
of equality. Finally, in terms of reproductive rights and abortion, a norm rejection took place 
in both Chile and Venezuela and this was due to the strength of religious groups in both 
countries, and their strict opposition to abortion. 
In regards to the comparative aspect of the thesis, it can be concluded that regime type does 
not seem to matter when comparing Chile and Venezuela. Although, when looking at Chile 
before and after the dictatorship, there is a clear variation in norm acceptance; more 
transnational norms were localized after the transition to democracy. On the other hand, 
ideology does seem to matter, due to the high resonance between socialism and the idea about 
equality. Transnational norms of gender equality fitted well into the socialist agenda. 
Likewise, the hypothesis about religion can be confirmed regarding the localization of norms 
concerning women’s reproductive rights. Thus, religion only comes into play when 
transnational norms challenge the domestic norms of doctrinal morality. 
The basic finding in this thesis is that the domestic contexts in Chile and Venezuela to large 
extent determined norm localization. This research result can also be generalized to other 
cases. The study clearly shows how domestic features condition the local acceptance of 
transnational norms. However, regime type and ideology may interact differently with 
transnational norms in other political contexts. In terms of future research, the results of this 
study suggest that more focus should be put on the local context in the study of transnational 
norm diffusion and norm localization. Furthermore, it is necessary to test the same variables 
in different countries. Firstly, to clarify and prove the positive relation between socialism and 
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the localization of norms of gender equality, and furthermore to assess the influence the level 
of democratization
51
 has on norm acceptance. 
The limited amount of academic literature concerning the case study of Venezuela constitutes 
the main limitation of this study. Therefore, the argument and determination of causality may 
be more solid in the case of Chile. Furthermore, to better assess and establish causality it 
would have been necessary to make interviews with different relevant actors. 
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